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In The Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
THE STATE OF UTAH

'

Plaintiff-Respondent,

-vsEUGENE MEYERS,

Case No.
12738

Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE
OF THE CASE
The appellant, Eugene Meyers, appeals from a
judgment and sentence entered against him in the Third
Judicial District Court convicting him of forgery.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
Appellant was tried and convicted of forgery on
December 22, 1971. On January 4, 1972, Judge Joseph
G. Jeppson committed appellant to Utah State Prison
to serve a sentence of one to twenty years.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks reversal of the lower court and
remand for a new trial.
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Appellant was charged with forging a check 011
the account of Royal Bell. Trial was held on December
16, 1971, December 17, 1971 and December 22, 1971.
Appellant was present at his trial the first two days,
but failed to appear on December 22, 1971. (R. 68)
The state moved that the trial continue even though
appellant was not present. (R. 65) Counsel for appel·
lant asked that a mistrial he declared and that the trial
be rescheduled and tried upon appellant being arrested
upon a bench warrant. (R. 66) The court granted the
motion to continue ( ll. 66) and then required defense
to rest. (ll. 67)
After the jury retired, counsel for appellant ex·
cepted to instructing the jury without the presence of
the appellant, and further objected to any further pro·
ceedings in appllant's absence. (ll. 69) The jury re·
turned a verdict of guilty (It 71) and sentencing was
set for December 29, 1971 (R. 72), but was held Jan·
uai·y 4, 1972.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE COURT BELOW ERRED IN CONTIN·
UING THE TRIAL IN DEFENDANT'S AB·
SEN CE.
Appellant contends that continuing his trial in his
absence was a denial of due process.
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In lI opt v. ·utah, llO U.S. 574, 4 S.Ct. 202,
28 L.Ed.2cl ( 1884), it was rec o g n i zed that
if the defendant was deprived of his life or liberty
without being personally present at his trial, and if such
deprivation violated the requirements of certain territorial legislation, such deprivation would be without
due process of law required by the Collstitution.
Although holding that the defendant's absence
from certain appellate proceedings did not constitute
denial of due process, in Schwab v. Berggren, 14:1 U.S.
442, 12 S.Ct. 525, 36 L.Ed.218 (1892), the court recognized that the personal presence of the accused, from
the beginning to the end of a trial for a felony, involving life or liberty, as well as at the time final judgment
was rendered against him, was vital to the proper conduct of his defense and could not be dispensed with, and
that if an accused was deprived of his life or liberty
without being so present, such deprivation would be in
\'iolation of due process.
\Vhile holding that an appelate court did not clepr've the defendant of due process by taking certain
action in his absence, in Dowdell v. United States, 221
U.S. 325, 31 S.Ct. 590, .55 L.Ed. 753 (19ll), the court
expressed the view that in II opt v. Utah (supra) it had
been held that due process of Jaw required the accused
lo be present at every stage of the trial.
In State v. Recd, 65 l\Iont. 51, 210 P. 756 (1922),
the court recognized that a defendant in a felony case
has a constitutional right to be present at his trial and
that a state statute also provided that he defendant must
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he present. The court held that the receipt of the verdict
was a part of the trial and hence the defendant had to
be present. The defendant's right to be present was held
not to be waivable.
Other cases have held that the defendant must be .
present at all stages of the trial and even voluntary ab. •
sence would be a ground to set aside the verdict and
grant a new trial. State v. Smith, 90 Mo. 37, 1 S.W.
753 (1886), Sherrod v. State, 93 .Miss. 774, 47 So. 554
( 1908), fVarfield v. State, 96 .Miss 170, 50 So. 561
( 1909).
1

!

In l•Uate v. Jla1111io11, 19 U. 505, 57 P. 742 (1899),
the court recognized that the Constitution of Utah pro·
Yides that the accused in criminal prosecutions shall have !
the right to appear and defend in person. Utah statutes \
were also held to guarantee the right of the accused in a ,
felony case to be present during his trial. The court also ·
found that a defendant cannot waive this right. (See
Utah. Constitution, Articl el, section 12, section 7, and
Utah Code Annotated 77-27-3.)
A ppdlant further contends that continuing his
trial in his absence Yiolated his Gth Amendment Rights
of the United States Constitution.
In [lnitcd States v. II ayman, 342 U.S. 205, 72 S.
Ct. 26:3, 96 L.:E.d. 232 ( l 952), the court expressed die·
tum to the effect that in a criminal trial where the guilt
of the defendaut is in issue ... his presence is required
by the Sixth Amendment .
.More recently, in llloinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337,
90 S.Ct. 1057, 25 L.Ed.2d 353 (1970), reh den 398 U.S.
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915, 90 S.Ct. 1684, 26 L.Ed.2d 80 the United States

Supreme Court sai<l that the confrontation clause of the
tith Amendment provides that in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to be confronted
with the wih1esses against him, and that one of the most
basic of the rights guaranteed by the confrontation
clause is the accused's right to be present in the courtroom at every stage of his trial. The court went on to
say that a <lisruptive defendant could be removed from
the court and his trial continued in his absence. However, the appellant is not in the same position as Allen.
Rather, appellant was absent from a part of his trial
and he was not removed from the court for being unruly. Allen deals with unruly defendants and grants the
court the right to remove them and proceed without such
defendants being present. Allen, however, recognizes
that defendants who are not unruly have to be present
during trial.
CONCLUSION
l•""'or the reasons above stated, that appellant was
denied due process of law and that his Sixth Amendment rights were violated when the court continued his
trial in absentia, appellant respectfully submits that
the judgment of the court below be reversed and that
his case be remanded.
Respectfully submitted.

D. GILBERT ATHAY
Attorney for Appellant

